IT IS generally recognised that the flexibility of firms' production will influence the nature of competition in an industry. For example, where production is very inflexible the Cournot outcome seems most appropriate: the Bertrand outcome, however, depends on production being perfectly flexible. The model presented makes both the firms' cost structure (flexibility of production) and the nature of competition endogenous, and thus provides a framework in which both elements of industrial structure and the conduct of firms are explained. We combine two ideas in the recent literature on oligopoly theory: models of strategic investment (Brander and Spencer (1983), Dixon (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1984), Yarrow (1985) inter alia) and notions of the consistency of conjectures (Bresnehan (1981) in particular). The fundamental idea underlying this synthesis is very simple. As we discuss below, there is a precise sense in which Bresnehan's consistency condition relates firm's conjectures about each other's responses-and hence the degree of competition in the product market-to the firms cost functions. Strategic investment models, on the other hand, provide a framework for making the firm's cost functions endogenous: by choosing a level of investment, the firm decides which short-run cost function it will have. By combining the strategic investment framework with Bresnehan's consistency condition, we have a model in which both firm's cost structures and the degree of competition in the product market are endogenously determined. Thus we have a framework in which both a structural characteristic of the market (firms costs), and the conduct of firms are endogenously determined.
function. For a wide class of cost functions more investment will lead to a decline in the slope of the short run marginal cost function at any given output. An overall equilibrium in the two-stage model is a Nash-equilibrium in capital stocks, since each firm's profits can be given as a function of the capital stocks chosen in the first stage.
What differentiates the models is the assumption made about the market stage, the nature of competition in the product market. Brander and Spencer (1983) explore the model with a Cournot-Nash market stage, Dixon (1985) explores the case with a competitive market stage, whilst Eaton and Grossman (1984) and Yarrow (1985) consider a general conjectural variations model (see also Bulow et al. (1985) , and Fudenburg and Tirole (1984)). In the case of Cournot-Nash or conjectural variations in the market stage, the firm's investment decision determines the (short run) cost function that the firm will have in the market stage, and hence its reaction function in output space. Thus in essence the firms's choice of capital is ipso facto a choice of reaction function. An equilibrium in this type of strategic investment model is a Nash-equilibrium in a game where firm's strategies are reaction functions. Similarly, in the case of a competitive market stage the firm's investment decision determines its supply function in the market stage and hence we have a Nash-equilibrium in supply functions.3 A general (though not universal) property of these models is the phenomena of factor-bias. The strategic use of capital in the first stage means that there is an asymmetry between capital and labour. This asymmetry generally leads to a non-cost minimising capital-labour ratio. In essence, production is inefficient in the sense that firms, whilst on their short-run cost functions, are not on their long-run cost functions. This strategic inefficiency in production gives rise to a welfare loss.
The existing models of strategic investment discussed above have assumed 2This is not the Marshallian long run, since there is no entry. 3This contrasts with other models with Nash equilibria in supply functions-see Grossman (1981) and Hart (1982) . These models allow for a much wider set of supply functions. The main point is that the set of admissable supply functions in Dixon (1985) is defined technologically. a given degree of competition in the market stage: it is assumed that whilst the investment decision of firms will alter the degree of flexibility of production, this will have no effect on the nature of competition in the product market. It has been argued, however, that the nature of competition will be influenced by the degree of flexibility of production. One particularly interesting way of capturing this is to impose a consisteny condition (as in Bresnehan (1981)) in the market stage with a conjectural variation model. Loosely speaking, a consistency condition can be interpreted as requiring that firms' conjectures about each others responses equal the actual responses firms would make (given their conjectures). In the context or our model, one implication of this is that the more flexible is production, the more competitive will consistent conjectures be (see Section 1). If firms have totally inflexible production ("vertical" marginal cost) then the Cournot conjecture is consistent; if firms have perfectly flexible production ("horizontal" marginal cost) then the Bertrand conjecture is consistent; for intermediate degrees of flexibility, the conjecture will be between the Cournot and Bertrand values (see, Propositions 1-2, and also Bresnehan (1981 pp. 36-7).
In this paper, we combine the strategic investment framework with consistency of conjectures in the market stage. The firm's investment decision will determine its short run cost function, and hence its flexibility of production in the market stage. The flexibility of production then determines the nature of competition in the market stage. This enables us to capture the idea that the firm's investment decision will alter the nature of competition in the market stage, and that the degree of competition in the product market will hance become endogenous in a strategic investment model.
There are three main results in this paper. First, in equilibrium the degree of competition will lie between the Bertrand and Cournot values (Proposition 4(b)). Firms will choose to have an intermediate degree of flexibility of production. This contrasts with Dixon (1986) , where with a given degree of competition firms will prefer to have totally inflexible production. Secondly, the wage-rental ratio will influence the degree of competition: a very small wage-rental ratio will lead to Cournot conjectures (see Proposition 4). Thirdly, we are able to evaluate the result that with consistent conjectures there will be no inefficiency in production (Eaton and Grossman (1984 p. 6), Yarrow (1985, Section 6)). This result is shown to hold only when conjectures are exogenous and happen to be consistent in equilibrium. When conjectures are made endogenously consistent, there will generally be factor-bias. In any symmetric equilibrium this factor-bias will lead to undercapitalisation, a capital-labour ratio below the cost minimising level (Proposition 3).
Investment, conjectures, and consistency
In this paper we examine a two stage model of strategic investment, where the second market stage is a conjectural variations equilibrium, as in Eaton and Grossman (1984) and Yarrow (1985) . However, unlike these papers, we make the two firms conjecture about each other's output responses endogenous, by imposing a "consistency" condition. There are several related notions of "rationality" or "consistency", which originated out of Hahn's work on conjectural equilibria (1977, 1978 homogeneous product, then we have the competitive or Bertrand model, since firm i believes any change in its own output will be exactly offset by a change in the other firm's output, so that the price is unaffected. The more negative firm i's conjecture, the more accommodating it believes the other firm to be, in the sense that firm j will reduce its output in response to an increase i's output. Given firms' conjectures about each other, we can derive their reaction functions in output space, which give their actual responses. The consistency condition requires that at the equilibrium vector of outputs, the conjectured response equals the slope of the reaction function.
There are several conceptual and technical problems with the concept of consistency. On the technical level, there are no general results about either existence or uniqueness of consistent conjectures. Furthermore, the equilibrium may not be easy to characterise (see Ulph (1983) ). On the conceptual level, the conjectural variations model only allows firms to have a very specific type of conjecture: surely we would like to allow for firms to have much more general conjecture (non-linear conjectures, conjectures which allow for initial position). However, if we allow for a more general class of conjectures, the power of the consistency condition is greatly weakened: as Laitner (1980) shows, a continuum of consistent conjectural equilibria will exist (see also Boyer and Moreaux (1983) ). Furthermore, it can be very reasonably argued that the conjectural variations model tries to capture in a static model what is really a dynamic problem of firms responses to each other over time. The best way to concieve of a consitent conjectural equilibrium is within a framework of instantaneous responses, where firms can respond immediately to changes in each other's output. This paper does not aim to answer or solve these issues. Rather, we make assumptions about industry demand and firms cost that overcome the technical problems, and partly alleviate the conceptual issues.
There are two firms (the results obviously generalise) i = 1,2, which choose outputs xi > 0. They produce a homogeneous product, and there is linear demand.
Al: Industry Demand:
There are two factors of production, capital and labour. Capital is treated as fixed when output is chosen, but labour is freely varied. Proposition 2 tells us that as both firms' production become perfectly flexible (kn oo> ), then consistent conjectures tend to the Bertrand value: as both firms' production become perfectly inflexible, the consistent conjectures become Cournot. In this section we have examined the relationship between investment and the flexibility of production, and the relationship between the flexibility of production and consistent conjectures. The more each firm invests in capital, the greater is its flexibility of production, and the more competitive the consistent conjecture of both firms become. This relationship implies that firms can manipulate the degree of competition in the product market through their investment decisions.
Strategic investment with consistent conjectures
In this section we explore the full two-stage strategic investment model when firms take into account the effect of their investment decisions on the where 3c/3k1 is the partial derivative of the cost function c(x1, k1) with respect to k1, from A2. Turning first to the LHS of (2.9), if ScISk1 = 0 then the capital stock minimises the cost of producing x1. If Sc13k1 <0, then there is undercapitalisation, too little capital then that which minimises cost, the technology being too labour-intensive. If ScISk1 > 0, then we have overcapitalisation, with more capital than mimimises the cost of producing x1. Turning to the RHS of (2.9), if we consider the term in brackets, we have the difference between the firm l's conjecture about the firm 2's output response 01, and the actual response of firm 2 (recall that (MR2I3k1)I(MRl1 3k1) is the slope of firm 2's reaction function, (2.7)). Thus we obtain Eaton and Grossman's result that if the conjecture is greater (less) than the actual response, there will be a factor bias of overcapitalisation (undercapitalisation) (Eaton and Grossman, (1984) Proposition 2.1). If the actual and conjectured responses are equal, however, then there will be no factor bias, and the technology will be efficient.
For example, if firms have Cournot conjectures (4i = 0) as in Brander and Spencer (1983)
, then there will be over-capitalisation under A1-2. To take the other extreme, where firms have Bertrand conjectures as in Dixon (1985) , then there will be under-capitalisation. If there is a factor bias of under-or over-capitalisation, then this will lead to a welfare loss relative to the social optimum. If we adopt the consumer surplus approach, then there will be two sources of welfare loss. The first will be the standard "welfare triangle" due to output being restricted below the perfectly competitive level. The second will be due to average costs being above their minimum level, which follows from the factor bias. In Dixon (1985) , it is shown that in the case where the market stage is competitive, the lost surplus due to factor bias can exceed the surplus lost due to the restriction of output.
Eaton and Grossman's conclusion (1984 p. 6-7) is that if the product market is a consistent conjectural equilibrium, then there will be no factor bias. This result, however, is derived only for an exogenously given conjecture which happens to be consistent for the values of k the firms choose in equilibrium. If 4 happen to be consistent for a particular (equilibrium) k, then they will certainly be inconsistent for all other k, since the slopes of the firm's reaction functions will be different. If we believe that consistency of conjectures is a desirable property, then surely we ought to impose consistency on the firm's conjectures over the whole strategy space, for all k. Unless we impose 4 = +(k), then it is very unlikely that exogenously given conjectures will happen to be consistent at any particular (equilibrium) k.
Indeed, strategic investment models with inconsistent conjectures are rather unsatisfactory. If 01 = drj/dxi, then it is difficult to give a convincing account of the firm's decision making in the two stages of the model. In the strategic stage, when the firm chooses its capital stock, it knows the true structure of the market-its own reaction function and the reaction function of the other firm. Thus when the investment decision is made, the firm is assumed to know the actual slope of the other firms's reaction function. However, when it enters the market stage, the firm chooses its own output If we hold 02 constant, then, the change in 4)1 caused by k1 shifts firm l's reaction function further out, enhancing the effect with exogenous conjectures (see 2.12). However, the effect of increasing k1 is to make firm 2's conjecture 02 more competitive, shifting out firm 2's reaction function. This mitigates the expansionary effect, and the overall effect on xi seems to be ambiguous (although a negative sign seems unlikely, we haven't been able to rule it out). Turning to the overall effect of k1 on x2 when we take into account the change in 42 Setting 3Ui/3ki = 0, we obtain:
If we consider the RHS bracket, this is the difference between the actual output response in market stage (since pi are consistent), and the tradeoff between x1 and x2 which the firm in effect faces in the strategic stage. As is clear from Fig. 2 , since an increase in k1 makes both conjecture more competitive and shifts both reaction functions out, the trade off the firm faces in the market stage must be less negative than the slope of the other firm's reaction function (the slope A-B is more negative than the slope A-C). Combining 2.14), 2.15) and 2.16) we have:
(2.20) dx1/dk1 dlxl/dkl c2 (A-C) (A-B) Hence the RHs bracket of (2.19) must always be negative with endogenously consistent conjectures, in contrast to the zero value with exogenously consistent conjectures as in Eaton and Grossman (1984) . Whether this will give rise to under or overcapitalisation will depend on the sign of dx1/dkl:
Efficiency will only occur iff dxl/dk1 = 0. In the symmetric case, dx1/dkl > 0, so that we obtain undercapitalisation. To summarise this:
Proposition 3: Suppose an equilibrium k* exists in the strategic investment model. There will be undercapitalisation if output responds positively to investment. In a symmetric equilibrium there will be undercapitalisation.
Although we have not been able to rule it out, the case of overcapitalisation seems a rather unlikely curiosity.
We have not established whether or not an equilibrium exists: equation (2.19) is merely a necessary condition for firms to be on their reaction functions in the strategic stage. Even under such simple assumptions as A1-2, making conjectures consistent leads to a very complex relation between capitals k and outputs x. Ui may well not be concave in ki. However, Proposition 3 at least provides a counter example to Eaton and Grossman's result, and shows how it depends crucially on conjectures being exogenous.
Because it is not possible to formulate useful conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in this model, we cannot perform meaningful comparative statics on the model using the equilibrium conditions (2.19). However, we can use more general analysis to characterise the properties of any equilibria that exist. We close this section with an analysis of the impact of the rental-wage ratio r on equilibrium conjectures. As r increases, the cost of capital becomes expensive relative to labour. Intuitively, as r becomes very expensive, this will lead eventually to small levels of investment, which implies conjectures close to the cournot value. Thus relative prices in the factor market eventualy have an influence on the degree of competition in the product market. The basic point to remember is that changes in r have no direct influence on the consistent conjectures, which are determined only by the level of investment by the two firms (this stems from the fact that marginal cost in the market stage is unaffected by r, since capital is a fixed cost). The level of r will, however, influence the degree of investment in the industry in equilibrium.
An immediate implication of this analysis is that in the strategic investment framework, with a technology that has a strictly increasing smooth relationship between the labour input and output given capital, the assumption of either Cournot or Bertrand competition are too extreme. Of course, if the technology were Leontief in the market stage, then the choice of capital would tie down the capacity (i.e. maximum output) of the firm in the market stage, and hence lead to inflexible production (a "vertical" marginal cost at capacity). In this case the equilibrium consistent conjectures would be Cournot (out of equilibrium the analysis is more complex, depending on whether the capacity constraint binds). In order to have a Leontief technology in the market stage, we need not assume that the underlying technology is Leontief: it would suffice to have a putty-clay technology, where the capital-labour ratio is freely chosen with the investment decision in the strategic stage, but becomes fixed in the market stage. At the other extreme, if capital and labour are perfect substitutes in production, and cost the same (r = 1), then marginal cost is "horizontal" and output is perfectly flexible whatever the level of investment. In this case the equilibrium conjectures are Bertrand.
In the framework presented, firms are only able to influence the flexibility of production through their investment decision. It is possible to widen the firm's choice, for example, by allowing the firm to choose whether to precommit one or both inputs in the strategic stage (as in Dixon (1986)). Alternatively, the firm could choose the type of technology to influence the flexibility of production in the market stage. We leave these possibilities for future research.
Conclusion
This paper explores a model of strategic investment with consistent conjectures. This is a model in which the firm's cost structure and the nature of competition in the product market are endogenous. Thus aspects of both the industry structure (in this case costs) and conduct are determined. Two basic insights are explored. Firstly, that the nature of product market competition depends on the flexibility of firms' production. This is captured by imposing a consistency condition on conjectures. Secondly, the idea that firms can influence the flexibility of production, as in strategic investment models where firms choose their short run cost function through their investment decision. The model combines these two ideas, so that firms take into account the impact of their investment decisions on competition in the product market.
There are three main results in this paper. First, in equilibrium, the degree of competition will lie between the Bertrand and Cournot values. Secondly, there will generally be a factor bias, with undercapitalisation in any symmetric equilibrium. Thirdly, the degree of competition is ultimately sensitive to the wage-rental ratio. As capital becomes very expensive, equilibrium conjectures converge to the Cournot value.
The relationships explored in this paper are ultimately very complex. In order to understand complex phenomenon it is often necessary to construct simple models. This paper is no exception to this tendency. Even a slight relaxation of the A1-2 would make the model intractable and ambiguous. Thus the model should certainly be interpreted as an example rather than a general theory. However, it is hoped that the example is stimulating, and provides a useful first step. (b) If \/r < p0/2, then 0 cannot be an equilibrium, since either firm can produce a small output efficiently and earn strictly positive profits, hence in any symmetric equilibrium pi <0. To obtain a lower bound on 4i, we define an upper bound on ki. A necessary condition for Ui(i) mj 0 is that p -xi 2 Vr. Since with symmetry production is under-
